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# OTTOMAN NORTH AFRICA AND THE DUTCH REPUBLIC IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

by  
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The war against Spain caused the Dutch to extend their navigation and trade into the Mediterranean. This in its turn led to direct contact between the Ottoman governments of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in the early years of the seventeenth century or even earlier than that. In any case the relations with the «Turks» of Barbary date from before the Dutch established their links with the Sublime Porte in Istanbul in 1612 (1).

An important motive for the Dutch Republic to seek contact with Ottoman authorities in North Africa and Istanbul was to effect the release of many Dutch sailors held prisoner, as slaves to employ common usage in the dominions of the Grand Signior visited by ships from Holland. The first move to establish relations was made by the States General in The Hague. In 1604 a letter was addressed to the Pasha of Algiers (2). A group of «Turks» Muslims found aboard a Spanish galley squadron captured at Sluis in Flanders in 1604 was set free without ransom to be paid and sent home, *i. e.* to North Africa accompanying the letter as a token of goodwill. The Ottomans were requested to make a reciprocal gesture, liberating the Dutchmen in their keeping.

By this time Dutch shipping along the coasts of Northern Africa reached a sizable number. The English, and in their wake the Hollanders, both newcomers had learned by then some of the consequences of mediterranean seafaring, the risk of becoming a slave in the hands of the corsairs of Barbary. Another lesson soon learned was the profit to be gained in the exercise of privateering under the Ottoman flag. The Dutchman Simon Danser (died 1610 at Tunis probably) made an exemplary career to illustrate this point. The corsair fleets of Algiers, Tunis and in a much lesser degree Tripoli, were at this time transforming from galleys to sailing vessels. Algiers' squadron counting 50 sail in 1617 and 80 in 1625, other estimates even going up to 120 (3). Tunis' fleet always was smaller, 20 to 30 sailing vessels perhaps around these years.

One must realize to put the illfamous corsairs of Barbary in their proper perspective, that for instance a Western European seapower like the Dutch Republic commissioned 130 privateers in the period 1606 - 1609 with official permission to attack the enemy anywhere at sea, to harass Spanish shipping and to bring profit to the treasury, 20% of all prizes' value to be reserved for the States General and 10% to the Stadtholder the sovereign price issuing the letters of marque in the early years of the Dutch Revolt.

Of course it was true that for privateers the enemy was an object loosely defined. Ships not well armed could easily be considered as a prize to be taken. Next to the Ottoman corsairs, Dutch privateers came into action in the Mediterranean. In the period after Lepanto the sea was wide open to all comers. Algiers next to Naples the largest city in the area welcomed all sellers of prize goods and slaves to its port and bazaars. This expanding centre of trade and shipping could not do without European trade and manpower. Sailors and nautical technicians from southern and western Europe, Dutchmen for instance, could find ample employment there.

For Dutch privateers to use Algiers or Tunis as their base to fight the Spaniards even had a patriotic flavour at the time of war between their homeland and the Habsburg oppressors (1568 - 1609, 1609 - 1648). The conclusion of a Twelve Year Truce created problems for many Dutch privateers who did not wish to relinquish their profitable trade. One option chosen often, was to change flag and become an Ottoman corsair. In this change of nationality and legal status the borderline between privateer and pirate was easily crossed, that will be obvious.

The activities of Dutch privateers were looked upon quite favorably in North Africa. These fellow fighters of Spain their common enemy, were easily admitted into harbour. After settling in Ottoman territory they relinquished their original Dutch commission as a privateer and a number «turned Turk» making Barbary their new home. In 1626 fifty five of the principal corsair captains of the fleet of Algiers were Dutchmen by origin (4). Names given as example, noted down by the Dutch special envoy to Algiers in 1622, Professor Pynacker, are amongst others : Kör Murad Reis, in Algiers since 1618, after 1621 also based on Salée, originally called Jan Jansz, from Haarlem. His ship visited the town of Veere in the Dutch province of Zeeland in the winter of 1624. His corsair activities brought the first «Turks» to Iceland (5). Süleyman Reis «Peatcutter» commanded a fleet of 25 big sailing ships («bertoni», «burtun») from 1606 till 1620. Later also held command in the Ottoman main fleet in the Archipelago. Sefer Reis was ex Thomas «Pickpocket». 'Ali (Bitchinin) Picinino Reis was *beylerbey* of Algiers in 1645. He originated probably from Flushing. According to the Dutch consul Wynand de Keyser he functioned some time as *emin* of the *Kursan taifesi* (the «taiffa» of corsairs) (6).

These man and names are tokens of a blend of the Muslim and Christian maritime culture which was characteristic of Ottoman North Africa and made it an early example of modernization and westernization in the Islamic world.

Together with the import of free or captive manpower trade brought war materials ship's parts and building materials, timber, iron, tar, etc. into Barbary. The exchange was made with prize goods and European slaves (Tu. *esîr*), who were an investment rather than workingpower since galleys went out of use. Ransom money was the aim of slavery. The slavemarket had the character of a stock exchange rather than that of a cattlemarket. In this context it should be underlined that captives converted to Islam being unsaleable to Europe, conversion was the exception and not promoted at all by their owners.

The presence of a great number of Christian European captives waiting for their redemption in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli contributed to the cosmopolitan character

of those cities. Livorno formed their counterpart being the centre for trade to Africa, amongst other things functioning as a entrepot for Muslim slaves to be exported. Brokers for this trade were often Jewish merchants of Sephardic origin established with compagnons in Italy, France, Amsterdam and the ports of Northern Africa. Names recurring in documents are e.g. Alcalai, Belmonte, De Leon, Manrique, Pardo, De Paz, Palache, Querido and Toledano. This is not to say that these Jewish merchants held a monopoly or a majority share in the trade, but their network of family relations in the Sephardic diaspora from Istanbul to Amsterdam across the Mediterranean lands of the 17th and 18th centuries created another level of cultural unity and communication crossing the existing political and social barriers.

Dutch trade into the Mediterranean and to the Levant flourished in the first half of the 17th century. At a value of ca. 5 million florins, this may be estimated to be 5% of the total of Dutch trade. The share of North Africa is hard to guess. Most ships visited the ports there in passing on their way to Italy, Livorno, Venice, or the Levant. Trade was not so much in the well known exports of Barbary such as hides, leather, sponges, wax dates and grain but in prize goods, contraband materials of war and slaves. Dutch ships probably took part in the so-called caravan trade, transport between ports in Africa and the Levant of goods and passengers. The French and English did a great deal of this kind of shipping. The nature of this shipping trade precludes the availability of any statistical data, customs registers, consular records or any sort of bills of lading.

To get an idea of the size of dealings in the corsair ports, in the years 1613 - 1621, 963 vessels were brought inside Algiers (7). Expense for the redemption of a Dutch slave in Algiers on October 15, 1622, calculated in Spanish dublons (*doblas excelentes* or double ducats of 7 gr. c.q. double *escudos* at 6.75 gram) was as follows:

– to the owner	1000
– to the Beylerbey (10%)	100
– to porttaxes (1%)	10
– <i>hüçett</i> of redemption	46
– for inspection of the outgoing ship carrying freed slaves	.....
– to <i>çavuş</i> and <i>yasakçı</i>	46
– to the <i>emir</i> of the customs (2%)	20
– to the dragoman	18
– to the <i>yasakçı</i> (Janissary guard of the Dutch consul's house)	9
– to the Dutch Consul	0 (or 10)
– difference of bill of exchange (ca. 30%)	377
Total	.....1636 (8)

Privateering was essential to the Algiers economy to provide its needed commodities. As a consequence peace with all naval powers at the same time was avoided.

The government of the Dutch Republic like other states, in its turn sought to limit the damage done to her shipping. Twelve hundred Dutch vessels were passing yearly through the Straits of Gibraltar in this period. Keeping contact with the local

Ottoman authorities was thus in order next to maintaining an embassy in Istanbul.

Soon after the grant of Capitulations (*ahdname*) to the Dutch in 1612, it became clear that the application of privileges in the North African provinces did not follow as a matter of course (9). Fermans (*hükm, emr-i şerif*) were duly issued and transmitted either by messengers of the Porte or by the Dutch embassy, the interested party (10). The orders of the central government however did not produce the results desired such as the liberation of all slaves without ransom or the application of only 3% duty on import and export.

The provincial governments in North Africa had a policy of their own in matters economical and political. Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli acquired wide powers of autonomy hardly ever allowed to local governors elsewhere in the Ottoman dominions of the 17th century except the *beylerbey* at Buda.

Diplomatic relations of their own with foreign powers were allowed by the Porte to the Barbary provinces (11). The authorities writing to the States General in The Hague invited the Dutch to establish direct contact by correspondence and by sending a permanent envoy a consul (Tu. *balyus orkonsolus*). Such a representative would be the suitable partner in discussing common matters of interest such as the modalities for the liberation of Dutch captives. The *de facto* ruler of Tunis, Yusuf Dey (1610-1637) answered the States General whose message he had received by a messenger of the Dutch ambassador at the Porte, Cornelis Haga (1612-1639 in Istanbul). Yusuf Dey acknowledged the grant of capitulations by Sultan Ahmed I (1603-1617) and the Dutch proposals to keep peace and friendship (*sulh-u-selâh ve 'ahd-u-amân*). Dutchmen held as slaves in Tunis were to be set free at his expense and delivered to the Dutch envoy. Dutchmen serving at sea could not be liberated just now. Their time would come when disembarked. The Dey demanded that captains of Dutch ships would be provided with documents sealed by the authorities in Holland to prove their nationality by such *mektubnâme* when at sea upon meeting corsair cruisers of Tunis. The Dutch should behave correctly and not damage Tunisian vessels (*çektirir kalite, burtun, tartane*). At inspection the Dutch should not be carrying enemy cargo and if so, it must be delivered without protest. Persons enemy subjects, merchants or sailors, will be made prisoner (*esîr*). Dutch ships should not violate the peace on meeting corsairs from Tunis. Dutch subjects serving aboard vessels of Spain, Naples and other hostile countries or established in such countries will also be taken prisoner in case of being involved in an armed encounter. It is imperative that a consul will be sent to assist in solving our mutual problems and conflicts (12).

It should be noticed that a contemporary translation in Dutch differs quite considerably in details from the Turkish text. In translation the name of the Dutch messenger is given, Gian Giacomo Belegno, dragoman of ambassador Haga. The Ottoman sultan's messenger, Ömer Agha is also named. This man was in fact an agent of the *kapudanpaşa* Halil Paşa sent to carry fermans to Barbary and Holland on a fact finding mission (13). The mention of the arrival of a Dutch man of war is added. In general the tone of the translation is rendered apologetic and submissive in contrast with the original demanding style. Many details on persons, slaves are added. The

*pençe*-signature of the Dey is given as «Your Highnesses' very affectionate friend and servant, governor and protector of the men at arms or garrison of the Kingdom of Tunis».

This letter is an early exposé of the Tunisian point of view on the relationship with Holland containing points later to be included in the treaties with that country.

The Dutch ambassador Haga organised a diplomatic conference in Istanbul in 1026/1617 with the newly appointed *beylerbey* of Algiers, Suleyman Paşa («Cathagna») a client of Halil Paşa, Grand Vizier (1617 - 1619) and formerly *kapudanpaşa* (1609 - 1611, 1613 - 1617). The new pasha agreed to the full application of the Dutch Capitulations, especially its articles on trade and navigation, 21, 23, 34, 43 and the liberation of slaves.

A diplomatic negotiation like this tripartite conference was still a novelty in this period. It can be understood as an essay of the Grand Vizier to retain some political authority over this outlying province which had important maritime connections in the Western Mediterranean. Halil Paşa as High Admiral (*kapudanpaşa*) became experienced in naval affairs and foreign policy. The maritime provinces in the Aegean and North Africa belonged to the sphere of his authority already then. Halil Paşa endeavoured to devise a foreign policy against Habsburg power in the Mediterranean. Elements of such a policy had to be the naval power of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli as well as the recent Dutch naval and commercial presence in the area (14). Hence the common interests of the Ottoman Vizier and the Dutch ambassador to come to an agreement with the government of Algiers. It must be remembered that the provincial squadrons of Barbary formed the most advanced part of Ottoman naval power consisting mainly of sailing ships in marked contrast with the main fleet of the *kapudanpaşa* still composed of galleys mainly.

The Western European states, France, England and Holland were interested in real control over Barbary by the Porte as well since one hoped still at this time that the capitulatory rights could be enforced in North Africa by means of the central Ottoman government. One result of this conference was that the Dutch ambassador appointed a consul for the three provinces, to reside at Algiers. The points of agreement were summed up in an imperial ferman (15). The Dutch consul Wynand de Keyser arrived in Algiers per Dutch man of war in the same year 1617. In Tunis a vice consul was appointed (16). Their task was no easy one. For instance there were 27 Dutch slaves in Tunis of whom only 13 were set free without ransom ; for 11 had to be paid in 1616. In 1619, 53 Dutchmen were freed. To regain ships taken into harbour was even more difficult in spite of the fact that only a minority had transgressed Ottoman law regulating trade in grain and other contraband goods or did not carry ships certificates clearly establishing their origin and purpose.

Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli kept insisting on their right of inspection of ships and seizure of goods property of enemies, neither of which the Dutch wished to accept.

The mere consular presence did not ensure that capitulatory rights were recognized. As a result the States General, the Dutch government, began to send its warships to North Africa to insist with armed force upon the release of captives. A conflict ensued in 1618.

Cooperating with Spanish forces, twelve Algerine corsair vessels were taken. The 1617 agreement became null and void. War between Holland and Algiers lasted till 1621. At that time the Dutch war with Spain was reopened and Algiers agreed now to go together attacking the common enemy of the Ottoman Empire and Holland. Shortly after 1621 an English consul was appointed to Algiers to ensure direct contact. The British ambassador Sir Thomas Roe realized by now that diplomatic efforts were needed to safeguard British shipping from interference by Ottoman corsairs (17).

In 1622 Tunis expressed its wish to join Algiers in peace with the Dutch. To confirm this new state of affairs the States General sent an extraordinary ambassador to Algiers and Tunis. This first mission of Professor Cornelis Pynacker was quite successful (18). Treaties (*sulhname*) were made. Algiers conceded not to inspect Dutch ships for enemy goods, respecting the rule of «free vessel free cargo». Tunis though did not wish to refrain from inspection. The text of these treaties is evidence of the bilateral character of these diplomatic instruments, quite different from the capitulations granted instead of formally negotiated by the Sublime Porte in this period. We see here the beginning of the special relationship of Ottoman Barbary with European powers from the 17th till the early 19th century, characterized by its modern style more or less conforming to established European diplomatic and legal usage.

“Ben venito ben venito Signore Ambasciator Fiamenco, all fede de Dio, il ambasciator porta bella gente”, with these words in lingua franca the Dutchman was welcomed into the Ottoman Mediterranean civilization of Algiers.

France was at war with that province ever since 1610, constantly in conflict with Spain and now with England as well since the attack by a squadron commanded by vice admiral Sir Robert Mansell (19). Not surprisingly the *beylerbey* and *divan* of Algiers were thus well disposed to what the Dutch ambassador was demanding from them: “tuto è buono sta pace pace” was loudly shouted at the weekly session on Saturday (20). During the talks Pynacker could converse in Italian with the *beylerbey*, Hüseyin Paşa. A draft treaty in French was produced. The official text in Turkish was provided with the sealstamp and *pençe* signature first of the Agha of Janissaries and secondly by the Pasha in the public session of the *divan* of October 16, 1622, the negotiations having begun on September 4.

The capitulations of 1612 and the 1617 Agreement of Istanbul were confirmed (21). The treaty of Algiers and the Dutch Republic of October 16, 1622 had as its mainpoints that Dutch slaves were to be set free in exchange of 12 Turks held prisoner on Malta. Trade was to be free and unhindered. Dutch ships were allowed to show their documents for inspection aboard the Algiers corsair-cruiser. Common action was proposed against Spain. The Dutch consul had to remain resident. Dutch harbours were to be open to Algerine corsairs. Purchase of one warship and guns was to be allowed in Holland. It should be noticed that no mention was made of the Algiers' right of inspection and of eventual payment of ransom for the freeing of Dutch subjects.

The *beylerbey* of Algiers confirmed it by letter of February 1623/cemazi II 20 - 30 1032. Stress was laid on Spain being the common enemy against whom common

action should be undertaken soon. Dutchmen, young boys included, were not to be held as slaves. Mutually correct treatment of ships at sea was asked. Friendship was extended to each party's friends. Spanish goods were not to be loaded on Dutch ships.

The citizens of Emden (East Friesland in Germany outside the Dutch Republic) were to be considered equal to Dutch subjects. Trade was free for all. The Dutch consul was permitted to demand costs for his consular services as was usual, his residence's immunity was recognized (22).

Negotiations with Yusuf Dey of Tunis (1610 - 1637) assisted by his close collaborator «Fendri Shaban» a muslim convert of Amsterdam origin, lasted from the beginning of November till early December 1622. The treaty agreed upon contained Tunis' adherence to the Capitulations granted to the Dutch by Sultan Ahmed I in 1612. The Dey insisted however on the right of inspecting Dutch merchantmen and to seize any Spanish or enemy cargo found aboard (23).

Confirmation by i.a. the Janissary Agha of Tunis, Abdurrahman followed in a letter of Muharrem 20 - 30, 1032/25 november 1622 (24).

A term of six months truce was given to the Dutch during which they should send their ratification. By April 1623 both treaties were ratified by the States General. With their permission a warship and guns were sold to Algiers. In the winters of 1624, 1625 and 1626 Algiers corsair ships visited Dutch ports to repair; one of the consequences of the new friendship.

A further corroboration of these treaties was still deemed necessary by the Dutch ambassador resident in Istanbul. Evidence of his still lasting misconception of the true relationship between the Porte and its three provinces in North Africa are two *fermans* of Sultan Murad IV (1623 - 1640) dated *cemazi I*, 1 - 10, 1034 / February 9 - 19, 1625 at Istanbul, addressed to the *beylerbey* of Algiers and Tunis respectively (25). These *fermans* refer to the complaints lodged by *arzuhal* of the Dutch ambassador Haga concerning the damage done by corsairs and *levends* of Algiers and Tunis outside the Straits of Gibraltar to Dutch next to French and English shipping, in spite of existing capitulations. The visit of corsairs to Dutch ports at the end of a tour through the English Channel and the North Sea was not approved of either. Such behaviour was in conflict with the capitulations and the Sultan ordered it to be desisted from. The present *ferman* (*emr-i şerif*) should be registered in the *divan defterleri* and its contents obeyed.

The authentic original copies were carried to Barbary by Haga's dragoman Gian Giacomo Belegno in accordance with the usage that the interested party was entrusted with the delivery of the Sultan's commands (26).

In 1625 Professor Pynacker arrived on a second mission in Barbary. This time the Dutch ambassador came next to demanding redress of damages done by corsairs to French fishermen, to ask secretly the favour to be granted a territorial concession on the coast of Algiers near Stora and Collo (Skikda), to install a support station and pearl fishing enterprise for Dutch shipping, to all practical purposes a Dutch corsair base was intended by a group of influential businessmen of Amsterdam.

Such a concession was not to be had (27). The new treaties negotiated this time differed from the earlier ones. Confirmed was that Dutch slaves were not to be

circumcised by force. More important, Algiers insisted now on its right to inspection aboard and to delivery of enemy goods even without it. Conceded was that Algiers corsair ships going to Holland were not to be manned with Dutch converts to Islam («renegates») or Dutch slaves. The French captives taken in the Channel and North Sea were only to be set free at the price of 16 000 florins. A letter by the Agha of Janissaries of Algiers to the States General corroborated the treaty of 10 articles now made with the full agreement of the Agha, the *manzul* (retired) Aghas, *Yayabaşıs*, *Bölükbaşı*, *Odabaşı* all together in the *divan* (28).

A new treaty of 15 articles Pynacker also negotiated at Tunis in June 1626. This time the Dey renounced his right of inspection and also agreed not to man the ships going to Dutch waters with Dutch muslims or slaves (29).

Neither treaty was ratified by the States General. The one sided nature of these treaties, containing concessions from the corsair governments without compensation from the other party made them a vulnerable affair, that much was apparent. An ambivalent relationship was the outcome.

The Dutch merchants endeavoured to safeguard navigation in another manner. In 1625 the Board of Directors of Levant Trade and Navigation into the Mediterranean Sea was founded at Amsterdam. This public body was to organize traffic and the equipment with arms of all Dutch merchantmen going through the Straits of Gibraltar. It was empowered to issue binding regulations to the trade.

The Barbary provinces seemingly did not attract much organized trade from Holland. The directors of Levant Trade soon after 1630 lost interest in the affairs of that area (30). The lack of documentary evidence from the period of existence of the Board of Directors of Levant Trade (1625 - 1826) must not be considered conclusive though. The Dutch may have participated in so-called caravan shipping along the shores of North Africa, though the big Dutch ships rarely did so in the Levant.

Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were ready markets for ships parts, guns and lighter firearms as imports, and prizes as exports next to grain and other local products. Much of those goods were dealt with in a semi-clandestine way since these were defined as contraband.

Sephardic Jewish brokers with associated firms in Barbary, Italy, Spain, Amsterdam and Morocco played an important part in the arms trade. A special place in the trade exchange had the so-called presents (qualified as ordinary *i. e.* yearly and consular *i. e.* once in two years), demanded by the Barbary governments at the occasion of negotiation of treaties and their renewal. The expense for these cargoes of shipsparts, timber, iron and armament were borne by the Boards of Admiralty in Holland and not by the Directors of Levant trade. It is obvious that the admiralties took an interest in the affairs of Barbary, a maritime area to which they were sending single warships or whole squadrons for the protection of Dutch shipping since 1615. This task was the beginning of the role played by the Dutch navy in diplomatic relations between Holland and the Ottoman provinces in North Africa till 1816, a role to be compared to that of the British navy in the same period (31). Affairs from day to day were taken care of by the consuls appointed at Algiers and Tunis and later at Tripoli. From time to time extraordinary embassies were sent to negotiate treaties or their renewal. The

sending of warships to show the flag was considered to be a necessary complement of force in support of the work of peace.

After 1648 when the war with Spain ended, the common element of action against that power fell away. Commercial interests remained. Holland became the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean for some time, or so it seemed when looking at the size of its fleet present there. No policy however was developed in the area. During the Anglo-Dutch wars 1652 - 1654, 1665 - 1667 and 1672 - 1674 the relations with the Barbary provinces acquired an increased importance to support Dutch naval activity. Conflict however again and again interrupted the peace. The Dutch admiral M. A. de Ruyter (1607 - 1676) had a wide experience as a privateer in these waters dating from his early years before becoming famous as the Dutch naval hero par excellence. In 1662 it was he who came to Algiers and Tunis (and also to Tripoli, but without success) to negotiate a renewal of the peace. He commanded a squadron of 11 sails at the time. In Algiers Hammuda Paşa and Yusuf Reis (by origin Dutch Gerrit Jacobsz of Enkhuizen) were his partners in the talks which led to the treaty (*sulhname*) of 1073/1662 (32). The text offers some interesting details on how negotiations were done : the Dutch proposals were read aloud in the *divan* after their translation had been ordered. A condition put to the Dutch was that their privateers would not attack Algiers merchantmen. The inspection of Dutch vessels was to be effected by lowering a boat (*sandal*) with a few officers in it to see the *pasaporta* in evidence of the Dutch ship's nationality. Dutch slaves were to be liberated for ransom. Trade in Algiers was open to all, any goods could be sold in the markets being liable to the normal taxes (*öşürlerini vereler*). Shipwreck was free of duty to the beylik and to be disposed of by the owners. Dutch vessels arbouring a foreign flag however were liable to seizure. Conflicts between Muslims and Dutchmen fell to the jurisdiction of the *divan*, the Dutch among themselves had to apply to the justice of their consul. Dutch subjects found serving aboard enemy merchantmen would not, but those serving on enemy warships would be sold as slaves. Escaped slaves had to be returned by the consul upon notice having been given.

The redemption of slaves was arranged by Sephardic Jewish merchants in Algiers, Livorno and Holland. One of them Henrico d'Azevedo functioned as Dutch vice-consul around 1659. Some years later 1674 - 1683 a Louis d'Azevedo acted as resident of Algiers in the Dutch Republic (33). The great asset of such middlemen was their versatility in Arabic, Turkish, Spanish and Dutch.

Between 1662 and 1674 relations were at a low ebb, mainly because of the war situation of the Dutch Republic.

Hacı Mehmed, Dey of Algiers and Baba Hasan his *kethüda* (second in command or «steward») and son-in-law took the initiative to restore the old friendship. They sent a letter to Stadtholder, Prince William III. Its transmission was entrusted to the Algiers merchant Jacob de Paz and the Amsterdam physician Mose Rafael Salom, son of Louis d'Azevedo (34). Their proposal was to set relations on a new footing, Algiers was offered as a refuge for Dutch shipping. The States General now decided to dispatch an envoy, Thomas Hees, with instructions to conclude a treaty. In a squadron of 4 men of war he arrived in Algiers October 12, 1675 (35). The new treaty was

slow in the making. The Algiers government remained long hesitant whom to make peace with, France or Holland, at war with each other (1672 - 1678). In 1677, Algiers opened war with England which lasted till 1682. The Dutch were preferred at last in 1679.

The conclusion of the treaty of 1090/1679 and its supplemented definitive version of 1091/1680 is a milestone in the development of the Dutch diplomatic relationship with Ottoman North Africa.

The envoy Hees assisted locally by the merchant Jacob de Paz, who was temporarily appointed plenipotentiary and vice-consul, spent long years in Barbary and acquired an insight in local diplomatic usage. Negotiations were drawn out or reduced to mere waiting for an audience in the divan or at the residence of the Dey. Hees learned to appreciate the value of presents, «ordinary» and «extraordinary». Gifts of guns and ammunitions were a must. One had to get used to a constant change of fortune, the menace of war, a truce being offered on conditions, all varieties of practice in international relations to attract maximum attention of the other party, The Hague in this case. An offer of the delivery of some ammunitions or war materials would always have effect. Diplomacy thus changed into unilaterally enforced trade as it were.

The style of the Turkish texts of the treaties (*sulh ve ticaretname*) and letters as well as the annexed translations in French produced by the Algiers chancellery show what measure a European usage had been already adopted in this part of the Ottoman Empire before 1680. The treaty and its official translation carried the sealstamps and *penç*-signature placed under the last line of the text of the *beylerbey* Ismail Paşa, El-Hac Mehmed Dey, Baba Hasan, his *kethüda* (or *kahya*) and Mustafa, *Ağa-yi Kürsî* (36). An accompanying letter (*mektüb-i emr uslûb*) by the Dey and Baba Hasan, the factual rulers of the province to the States General and the Prince of Orange, Stadtholder of Holland was sent with it through the offices of De Paz and D'Azevedo via Livorno (37).

Ratification (*takrir u tahkik*) was demanded in a short time. No truce was declared in the meantime. The States General acted quickly and ratified the treaty on July 28, 1679. With this went a present of eight metal guns with all necessary equipment and ammunition "in order to be able to fire a salvo at the proclamation of peace".

The text of this treaty gives a good idea of what the relationship between the two parties should be in the eyes of the Turks. A new element introduced by Hees at the instigation of De Paz was the distinction made from now on of Dutch subjects, merchants (*tüccar reayaları*) being either Christian or Jew, both to enjoy equal rights and privileges accorded by treaty. This means that a great part of the trade under the Dutch flag to and from North Africa must have been in the hands of Jewish firms like those of De Paz and D'Azevedo. The transmission of money and the local financing of the redemption of slaves was a profitable business, if only because of the great differences in the rate of exchange of money lent were never much less than 30% in Algiers and its neighbouring states. What with dealing in arms ammunitions, ship's material and prizes, North Africa must have been a highly specialized market, difficult to enter for foreign merchants.

The contents of the twenty one articles (*şurût*) is as follows :

The protocol : lasting and inviolable peace between “ *Felameng bir olmuş memleket-lerinin el-aliyyîn ve kaviyyîn ale'l gaye hakimleri ve ... Uranca Amiri and the berlerbey, the dey “ ulu azîm ek-kirâm üldevletin El-Hac Mehmed Dayı ve Baba Hasan hazretleri Cezayir hakimleri... ve Ağa ile cümle ‘asker el-mansure kibâr ve siğâr* ” by means of the commissioners (*vekîller*) Hees and De Paz.

– Article 1 : peace to come into effect after ratification of this treaty.

– Article 2 : free entry and free trade for Dutch vessels (*kalyunları ve sayir gemileri*) owned by Christian or Jewish merchants. Goods sold being liable according to ancient custom to 10% taxation.

Contraband merchandise (*memnû' meta 'lar*) e.g. gunpowder, sulphur iron, timber, cordage, musquets being free of duty.

– Article 3 : mutual freedom of navigation.

– Article 4 : inspection at sea by Algiers cruisers by means of a boat (*feluka*) sent with only two inspecting officers to see the documents (*amânnâme, pasapurta*).

Likewise inspection by the Dutch of Algerine vessels which papers have to be certified by the Dutch consul (*tezkeresiyle*).

– Article 5 : no Algerine captain may seize persons aboard Dutch vessels.

– Article 6 : in case of shipwreck no confiscation but assistance towards salvage.

– Article 7 : no ships of Algiers may go to Sallee, Tetuan, Tunis, Tripoli or other places hostile to the Dutch or to serve those enemies as corsairs against them.

– Article 8 : no ship of Algiers may go privateering near the coasts or ports under dominion of the States General.

– Article 9 : enemy ships e.g. from Sallee are not allowed to sell prizes taken from the Dutch or Dutch captives within Algiers territory.

– Article 10 : Dutch men of war are allowed to enter Algiers ports and to sell prizes at their convenience free from duties (*gümrük ve bac*). All needed food and drink may be bought on the market.

– Article 11 : a Dutch man of war having entered the port of Algiers, notice of that must be given by the consul or its captain so that all owners of Dutch slaves can be warned to prevent their escape. Enquiries may be made discreetly with the Dutch commanders on the whereabouts of run away slaves. The former should be taken at their word. The Dutch consul nor his compatriots may be molested in this case ; abduction by Dutch ships will have to be reported by the consul to the States General and compensation given to the owners.

– Article 12 : after receiving the ratification no Dutch, Christians or Jews may be made captive in Algiers territory. The States General have no obligation to redeem slaves now or later ; the charitable work of redemption can be undertaken without restriction on the basis of a reasonable price agreed upon by the owner's free will, the owner being the *beylik*, a galley, the pasha, the dey, the ruler (*hâkim*) (meaning the *kethüda*), the agha or other authorities.

Emancipation, not necessarily at the original price of purchase, nor redemption to be forced upon the Dutch. Official Dutch representatives enjoy a reduction of duties payable to «Government House» (*Dâr ül-Kerime*). Private persons do not enjoy such reductions. The Dutch officials in Algiers are authorized to issue all relevant legal documents like those of other nations.

– Article 13 : inheritances of Dutch subjects belong to the appointed heirs or executors ; in the absence of a testament the consul is competent to receive.

– Article 14 : no constraint for Dutch merchants to buy nor for masters of ships to accept cargo or voyages, the consul is not liable for debts of Dutch subjects if he has not accepted a caution *hüccet* issued by the *cadi*.

- Article 15 : exception made for the rule of Islamic Holy Law, Dutch subjects, Christians or Jews fall under jurisdiction of the Dey in *divan* at the Pasha's Office. Affairs regarding only Dutchmen fall under their own civil and criminal consular court.
- Article 16 : Dutchmen in Algiers, guilty of murder, injury or offense to Muslims are liable to the same punishment as meted out to the latter, the consul is not liable for others.
- Article 17 : full immunity is given to the Dutch consul ; he may choose his dragoman and broker (*simsar*) ; he is free to visit Dutch ships and free in the exercise of his religion.
- Article 18 : in war and in peace the consul and all Dutch residents of Algiers retain full liberty of movement with all their family.
- Article 19 : being passenger on an enemy vessel does not justify ill treatment of person and possessions of Dutch subjects, Christian or Jew ; the same applies to Algerine subjects aboard vessels of enemies to the States General.
- Article 20 : at the time of arrival of the ratification by the States General hostilities will be ended. Compensation will only be given for damage or seizure made during the subsequent period before the conclusion of peace is generally known.
- Article 21 : incidental violation of the present treaty (*şurûṭ-i ahd*) by either party will not invalidate it. Matters will be settled amicably ; private persons guilty of violation of the *ferman* will be punished as seditious persons.

The date is *rebi* I 10 - 20, 1090.

According to information given by Hees, the *kethüda* Baba Hasan, the most powerful man in the state gave his support to Dutch interests concerning article 12. He introduced the element of reciprocity in article 19, with the argument that the province owned hardly any merchant ships. Hees stressed the need to appoint a new resident consul as soon as possible.

The visit of a squadron would do much good to the Dutch reputation and would be useful to bring ransom money. The financial interests underlying this last charitable purpose will not escape the reader. Redemption, i.e. slave trade had grown slack in spite of his good offices.

The recommendations of the plenipotentiary found acceptance with his masters in Holland. A new consul was appointed September 30th 1679 to replace Jacob de Paz whose status was a temporary one (38).

The Dutch man of war bringing the present of guns arrived April 22, 1680. Peace was proclaimed the first of May. The merchant Louis d'Azevedo was admitted as representative of Algiers in Holland (39). The text of the definitive version of the treaty dated *rebi* I 20 - 30, 1091 / May 1, 1680 was sent by Hees as soon as he reached Livorno on the way home, on May 20, 1680. It differed from the first version of 1679 only by an appendix (*hurûf*) again sealed and signed by the leadership of the province, written under the existing text. The points raised concern the redemption of slaves, their bill of health at departure and the prohibition to sell Dutchmen outside Algiers or to any but Dutch buyers. The style of the documents, the putting of sealstamps and *pençe* signatures on both text and translation of treaty and accompanying letters all express the desired bilateral character and an element of equality of the contracting parties. Hees and De Paz also signed all documents (40).

Thomas Hees was appointed for the second time to go to Algiers to effect the redemption of Dutchmen there and to travel on to Tunis and Tripoli to attain peace treaties there as well. He left June 1, 1682 and after a short stay in Algiers arrived April

23, 1683 in Tunis on a Dutch warship. The government of this province agreed to a truce only (41). In June 1683 the rulers of Tripoli followed suit and agreed to a treaty of peace identical to the one made with Algiers in 1680. A copy of that document was used with a separate document (*temessük*) dated *cemazi II* 25, 1094 and signed by the *beylerbey* Halil Paşa, the Dey Ali, his *kethüda* Mehmed and the Janissary Agha Abdülkerim. They declared to agree with this treaty (*ahdname*) after having discussed it in the *divan* with the other members including the admiral (*ocak kapudanı*) Aywaz, the vice-admiral (*patrona*) Hüseyin Reis, the rear admiral (*riyala*) Murad Reis and all the naval commanders and ghazis of the army (42). Hees also signed. Ratification was demanded within one year. Hees signed another document promising the Dey of Tripoli within 14 months after the conclusion of peace the delivery of 150 casks gunpowder, 3 cablelengths of rope, 3 000 gunballs of 4 to 8 pound plus 5 masts of 80 - 85 feet. Such promises he had given to Algiers and Tunis already. Such deliveries became a standard item in the negotiations to come.

Hees left his page Zacharias Cousart behind in Tripoli. The States General appointed this man as the first Dutch consul in that place (43). Hees left Holland on November 30, 1684 for the third time to transmit the presents and the ratifications for Algiers and Tripoli. At Tunis he failed again to negotiate a treaty of peace. Slaves could not be redeemed either. He left on May 27, 1685 for Livorno and home (44). The failure at Tunis fits in the pattern of traditional Barbary policy not to be at peace with the important naval powers all at the same time, so as to leave room for privateering.

On the whole one should not say that the treaties of 1679 - 1685 are devoid of political importance and merely evidence of the duplicity of the corsair states. These texts are showing that relations with Barbary are not governed by the Ottoman capitulations but the result of negotiated international treaties in the modern sense. The truly bilateral instruments show elements of reciprocity lacking in the Dutch capitulations of 1612, 1634 and 1681. The use of traditional Ottoman chancery practice and terminology should not mislead us to fail to notice the difference of the contents of the diplomatic documents from Ottoman North Africa.

In the 18th century political as well as commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire developed an increasing degree of regularity and stability. This was the case in the Levant as well as in North Africa.

In the eighteenth century, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli frequently acted in concert towards the European powers, such as the Dutch Republic. They shared one diplomatic representative, Jehuda Cohen whose efforts, begun already in 1699 on behalf of Tunis, led to new treaties between the three provinces and Holland in 1703 and 1704. The reatifications followed in 1707 (45). The Algiers treaty is remarkable as it is written in maghribi Arabic. Treaties and their ratifications were followed by presents, transported surely and safely by warships. From 1706 to 1712 a Dutch squadron was permanently present in the Western Mediterranean because of the war with France. The navy played an important role in diplomacy by now, which was formalised thus, that negotiations with the Barbary governments were conducted by naval commanders whose ships were lying in the harbour flying the white flag. British diplomacy in this area had adopted this style already before.

Conflicts at sea and dissatisfaction with the presents received (which indeed were sometimes of inferior quality : rotten masts e.g.), led to ruptures and renewed negotiations. New treaties with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were made in 1712 (46).

The Algiers treaty reduced customs duties for imports from 10% to 5% (article 2). The style of the treaty is different from earlier ones. Its articles are each written on separate sheets, each dated separately giving the impression of being a collection of 23 agreements all dated on June 18, 1712.

Following this treaty the so-called «Turkish Passes» (*amân mektubu*) were introduced for Dutch shipping to safeguard correct treatment and facilitate inspection at sea. The example was the system agreed to in the 1682 treaty, negotiated at Algiers by the British admiral Arthur Herbert (Earl of Torrington 1647 - 1716) (47).

The Turkish Passes were, unlike erroneous notions widespread among some non-orientalist naval historians, not Turkish but in our case Dutch documents, issued by the Boards of Admiralty in the Dutch provinces under their seal. The passes consisted of a upper and lower half. Their validity was for one voyage of maximally three years. Their use was prescribed also for navigation in the Channel and the Gulf of Biscay. Regular ships papers were conditional for Turkish Passes to be issued to a master, who received one half, the other being sent to Algiers.

Till 1748 the passes were only issued for Algiers. Later in the 18th century the corsairs of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were given certificates of nationality themselves to be protected against the inspection by Dutch warships during war between Holland and one of the corsair states (48).

Soon after 1712 the peace with Algiers was broken. Between 1714 - 1720 forty Dutch ships were seized and 900 sailors taken prisoner. Naval diplomacy failed in 1717, mediation requested from the Sublime Porte had no good effect either. Admiral Carel Godin came to Algiers in 1724 and was able to prepare the field for vice admiral François van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck who was able to conclude a treaty with the Dey on September 8, 1726. Its article 1 a propos gave the Dutch consul the right of chapel and a Dutch reformed minister opened church at Algiers (49). A similar treaty with Tripoli and one with Tunis were attained in 1728 by commander Grave (50). In 1730 Captain Cornelis Schrijver was sent to Algiers, to ask redress of some violations of the peace and to redeem a number of Dutch slaves as well as deliver the «ordinary» presents. The next year again the application of the Turkish Passes was matter of discussion at Algiers. Two Dutch East Indiamen had been seized in the Atlantic, not carrying passes. A confirmation of the existing system to be applied to all Dutch ships including East-Indiamen outside the Mediterranean was signed February 24, 1731 (51).

The delivery of presents became a yearly routine for 2 or 3 warships which showing the colour contributed to the maintenance of peace with the three Ottoman provinces. In 1735 an envoy from Tripoli visited Holland. His negotiations did not lead to a new treaty (52). From 1755 to 1757 the Dutch Republic was at war with Algiers. Rear admiral Joost Sels with a squadron of 5 sail was able to renew the peace on November 23, 1757, the treaties of 1726 / 1728 and 1731 being applied again (53). An appendix text (*hurûf*) to this was signed May 26, 1760.

A dispute on the use of weights and measures in the evaluation of the presents broke out in 1766 between Algiers and Holland. The Dey and *divan* insisted on local weightmeasures to be used for both the «ordinary» and «consular» presents. Captain Jan Binkes arrived at Algiers January 23, 1768 with the presents due for the two years past. After three months of dispute about the amount acceptable to the Dey the cargo was unloaded : a clock for private use by the Dey plus 1125 quintals lead, 500 quintals light cordage, 25 heavy cablerope, 10 heavy ropes of 120 fathoms, 20 masts, 500 pieces of timber, 1000 pieces pinewood timber, 100 beams of various size, 50 tons of tar (54). Presents in money were not accepted. Another example of what the Dutch Republic used to export to Algiers as a free gift, the 1783 present consisted of 44 000 pounds gunpowder, at the time of the united attack by Spain, Portugal, Naples and Malta.

In spite of lesser conflicts, for instance with Tripoli from 1789 till 1791 the Dutch Republic remained in peace with Barbary till 1792 when Algiers opened hostilities. Rear Admiral Pieter Melvill commanding a squadron of 7 sail made peace again in the beginning of April 1794 (55).

The end of the ancien régime of diplomatic relations between Ottoman North Africa and the Netherlands came in 1816 when a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet bombarded the city of Algiers. This feat of modern gunboat diplomacy executed by the admirals Sir Edward Pellew (Viscount Exmouth) and Theodorus F. van Capelle in order to enforce the abolition of slavery was in no measure compatible with the results obtained in the treaty of *şewwal* 6, 1231 / August 28, 1816, which confirmed all earlier treaties down to 1755 (56).

This survey of three centuries of political and economical relations between Ottoman North Africa and a Western European state, the Dutch Republic, is meant to demonstrate that in the spheres of warfare, trade, technology and human relations Barbary still played a role of importance and was in full intercourse with the northern shores of the Mediterranean world. It cannot be maintained that the «Islamic» and «Christian» halves of this world had become completely separated civilisations in contrast to the periods before 1600 (57). The continuity in Mediterranean Jewish culture and society is further evidence for this point of view.

The recent growth of scholarly interest in the Ottoman centuries of North Africa from historians in the Mediterranean lands and elsewhere does not warrant to qualify our subject in any way as a «forgotten» field of research. This essay, strictly limited to source materials in Dutch collections, illustrates how Barbary once had direct political economical and social bonds with distant Holland.

#### NOTES

(1) Cf. A.H. de Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic. A History of the earliest Diplomatic Relations 1610 - 1630*, Leiden-Istanbul, 1978.

Sir Godfrey Fisher, *Barbary Legend. War Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415 - 1830*, Oxford, 1957.

(2) Letter of States General (S.G.) d.d. 12.1.1604 publ. by K. Heeringa, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel*, I (2 parts) 1590 - 1660 (The Hague) 's-Gravenhage 1910 and II 1661 - 1726, 's-Gravenhage, 1917, vol. I (pt. 2) 637 - 8.

- (3) Reports and dispatches of the first Dutch consul in Algiers (1616 - 1627) Wynant de Keyser, publ. by Heeringa *op. cit.* I 745, 944, 958 ; G.S. van Krieken, "Trois représentants hollandais à Tunis (1616 - 1628)", *IBLA* 137 (1976) 41 - 71.
- (4) Heeringa, *op. cit.* 976 - 7.
- (5) Bernard Lewis, "Corsairs in Iceland" *ROMM* 15 - 16 (1973) 139 - 144 ; also in early version "Izlanda'da Türkler", *Türkiyat Mecmuası* X (1951 - 3) 277 - 284.
- (6) Ali Bitchinin's mosque, at one time the church of Sainte Marie des Victoires, is still standing.
- (7) Jean Monlaü, *Les états barbaresques*, Paris, 1964, 93.
- (8) Heeringa, *op. cit.* I (pt 2) 903.
- (9) Full text and translation of the Dutch Capitulations in De Groot (1978), *Ottoman Empire and Dutch Republic*, 231 - 260, 337 - 9 plus facsimile.
- (10) Authentic copies of such fermans to the *beylerbeys* of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli are kept in the General State Archives (A.R.A.) in The Hague, Records of the States General (S.G.) 12593- no's 23 (1024/1615) to Algiers, 24 dito to Tunis, 33 (1031/1622), 34, 41 (1034/1625), 43.
- (11) Letters to the States General e.g. from Hüseyin Paşa of Algiers s. d. SG 12593 - 26 ; from Yusuf Dey of Tunis (1024 - 1615) -27 ; Hüseyin Paşa of Algiers (1028/1619) -32 ; from Abdürrahman Agha of Janissaries in Tunis (1032/1622) ; from Hüsrev Paşa of Algiers (1033/1624) -38.
- (12) Written in Tunis 20 - 30 *receb* 1024/16-26 August 1615 (A.R.A. S.G. 12593-27).
- (13) Cf. De Groot, *op. cit.* 125-9, 141, 143, 305. For Belegno, cf. *ibidem* 125-6, 192, 309, 324.
- (14) Cf. De Groot, *op. cit.* 137 - 162.
- (15) This document is not extant in ARA records but often referred to in subsequent letters to the States General from the governors of Algiers, e.g. SG 125593-37 *Beylerbey* of Algiers to S.G. dd. 20 - 30 *rebi* II 1032/February 1623 ; cf. Heeringa I (pt. 2) 780.
- (16) Cf. O. Schutte, *Repertorium der Nederlandse Vertegenwoordigers residerende in het Buitenland 1584 - 1810*, 's-Gravenhage, 1976, which work lists almost all Dutch diplomatic and consular personnel having served in the Middle East and North Africa during the 17th and 18th centuries.
- (17) S.C. Chew, *The Crescent and the Rose*, New York, 1937 (reprinted 1974), 368.
- (18) G.S. van Krieken, ed., *Dr. Cornelis Pynacker, Historisch verhael van den steden, Thunes, Algiers en de andere steden in Barbariën gelegen*, 's-Gravenhage, 1975.
- (19) Chew, *op. cit.* 364 f. The English force consisted of 6 warships, 10 merchantmen (!) and 2 smaller vessels (pinnaces).
- (20) Heeringa, *op. cit.* I.
- (21) Summary of this *sulh-i selah* treaty in ARA SG 12593-36.
- (22) Turkish text ARA SG 12593-37 Dutch text in Heeringa, *op. cit.* I (pt. 2) 881-3.
- (23) Dutch translation publ. in *Groot Placaetboek*... ed. C. Cau, 's-Gravenhage 1658 - 1796, 9 vds. vol. II, 2293.
- (24) Turkish in ARA SG 12593-35.
- (25) Documents in usual size, 56.5 x 21 cm., 17 lines *divân*script, ARA SG 12593 no's 43 and 41 with identical texts.
- (26) De Groot (1978) 167, 175.
- (27) Van Krieken, *op. cit.* and *idem* "Une escale hollandaise à Stora", *RHM* 3 (1975), 84 - 90. Heeringa I (pt. 2), 982 ff., 1001 ff.
- (28) Letter d.d. *cemazi* II 1 1035 / Febr. 28, 1626 in Heeringa *op. cit.* (pt. 2), 984 - 5 (in *Lingua franca*).
- (29) Cf. Heeringa, *op. cit.* I (pt. 2), 989 - 90.
- (30) Heeringa *op. cit.* I (pt. 2), 1025.
- (31) Fisher, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

- (32) Turkish original in University Library Leiden, LW Cod. Or. 1380 Fasc. A, Dutch translation publ. in *Groot Placaetboek*, IV 292.
- (33) H. Hardenberg, *Tussen Zeerovers en Christenslaven*, Leiden, 1950, 41.
- (34) Letter in ARA SG 12593-57, Translation in French annexed contains many embellishments, such as a congratulation for his appointment to the Stadtholder, dated May 28, 1674.
- (35) Hardenberg, *op. cit.*, 36 ff.
- (36) ARA SG 12593-63-2.
- (37) ARA SG 12593-64-2. *Exhibitum* in the States General, June 7, 1679.
- (38) De Paz remained consul four years. Cf. Schutte, *Repertorium*, 364 - 376.
- (39) L. d'Azevedo remained in that quality till 1683, cf. *Resolutions States General* (R.S.G.), 25 - 3 - 1683.
- (40) Treaties of 1679 and 1680 a.o. related pieces in ARA SG 12593 no's 63, 64, (treaty 66 and 74 - 3.
- (41) ARA SG 12593-72 d.d. *cemazi* I, 10 - 20, 1094.
- (42) ARA SG 12593-74 no's 1, 2.
- (43) Cousart acted as consul from November 25, 1684 till 1696, cf. O. Schutte, *op. cit.* 364-5.
- (44) Hees' final report of November 1685 in Heeringa, *op. cit.* II, 522 ff.
- (45) Treaties in ARA SG 12597, 65, 64, 66 respectively.
- (46) ARA SG 12597 105, 111, 114 and 12636-1 (Algiers), dd. *cemazi* I 10 - 20, 1124 / 1712.
- (47) Fisher, *op. cit.* 264 - 5.
- (48) F.J.W. Sandbergen, *Nederlandsche en Nederlandsch-Indische Scheepsnationaliteit*, Leiden, 1931, esp. pp. 156 - 179.
- (49) J.J. Backer Dirks, *De Nederlandsche Zeemagt*, 4 vols., Rotterdam, 1865, - Nieuwendiep 1871, III, 195 - 6.
- J. van Oordt, *De privaatrechterlijke Toestand van den Nederlandschen Koopman in de Landen van den Islam*, Leiden, 1899, 236-7; The treaty in ARA SG 12597-146.
- (50) ARA SG 12597-152, October 4, 1728; Van Oordt, *op. cit.* 255 f.
- (51) Van Oordt, *op. cit.* 237; Sandbergen, *op. cit.* 165; J.G. Nanninga, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel*, III 1727 - 1765, 's-Gravenhage, 1952, 51 and IV *ibidem* 1765 - 1826, 1964 - 66 (2 parts), 449 - 50, 819, 824.
- (52) Van Oordt, *op. cit.*, 256.
- (53) Backer Dirks, *Zeemagt* III, 240 - 1. Van Oordt (1899) 237.
- (54) Backer Dirks III, 263.
- (55) Treaty dated April 1, 1794 (in Turkish) equalling the first of *ramazan* 1208. In ARA SG 12597-278, bound in *defter* format with the Dutch translation facing the Turkish text (*fihrist-i 'ahdname-i felemenk*).
- (56) Publ. in E.G. Lagemans, *Recueil de traités conclus par les Pays-Bas depuis 1813*, s'Gravenhage, 1858 - 1898, I, no. 49; also cf. Nanninga IV, 805 ff, 875 ff., 903.
- (57) Cf. C. Pellat and C. Imber in E.I.<sup>2</sup> s.v. *Qurşan*; A.C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, Chicago, 1978; idem "The Forgotten Frontier: The Ottoman North African Provinces during the eighteenth Century" in Th. Naff and R. Owen, eds. *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Carbondale, 1977, 74 - 87, 371 - 3.